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offered by International Shoe more to heart than have the federal
courts.
The drafters of the Business Corporation Act intended that the
local residents should have as much protection as possible.
It is thought the wise policy favors subjecting such foreign cor-
porations to suit here for the convenience of residents of this
state where it is constitutionally possible, since the alternative is
to force our residents to bring their actions in foreign jurisdic-
tions.49
While the decisions in the Byham and Abney Mills cases are not
earth-shaking deviations from a trend, the guidelines furnished by
the North Carolina Supreme Court as to what it considers to be
"transacting business" in section 55-144 and what constitutes "mini-
mum contacts" in allowing jurisdiction under section 55-145 (a) are
useful. Nevertheless, the basic problem of applying these concepts to
the particular activities of the defendant corporation will continue
to confront the court. It is inconceivable that this problem can be
alleviated by substitution of legal rule for ad hoc judgment.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Criminal Law-Credit for Time Served Under a Vacated Judgment
Upon Retrial and Second Conviction
In the recent case of State v. Weaver' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed its former position and allowed the time
served in prison by the defendant prior to his collateral attack upon
the previous proceedings and subsequent retrial and conviction, to
count toward his prison sentence resulting from his second trial.'
Defendant was first tried in May 1963 and pleaded nolo con-
tendere to a charge of felonious assault.3 He was sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than five or more than seven
"' Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 54 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
1264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965).
2 Id. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953) provides:
Any person who assaults another with a deadly weapon with the
intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in death, shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison or be worked under the supervision of the State Highway
and Public Works Commission for a period of not less than four
months nor more than ten years.
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years. On May 9, 1963, he was committed to state prison and began
serving the sentence. On September 25, 1964, after a habeas corpus
4
hearing in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina, defendant was awarded a new trial.5 From
October 8, 1964, until the new trial in December 1964, he was con-
fined in county jail, apparently because of failure to meet the bond
requirement.' At the second trial in December 1964 defendant was
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon-a general misdemeanor'
-which is a crime of less degree than the one for which he was
charged at the first trial.' Defendant was sentenced to two years,9
which was the maximum legal sentence for this offense.10
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that from May 9,
1963, until September 25, 1964, defendant's de facto status was
that of a prisoner serving a sentence and that this time should be
credited against the two-year maximum sentence imposed at the
second trial. The court further ruled that the defendant's status
from September 25, 1964, until the second trial in December 1964
was that of a person under indictment awaiting trial, and in custody
on account of his failure to give the appearance bond fixed by the
district court. This time would not be credited to the sentence
imposed at the second trial."
There are four situations where the question of credit for time
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1959), which provides for the writ of habeas
corpus to extend to a prisoner who is in custody in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws or treaties of the United States.
5 264 N.C. at 682, 142 S.E.2d at 634 (reversed on grounds that defendant
had not been represented by counsel at the first trial).8Id. at 683, 142 S.E.2d at 635.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953) provides: "In all cases of assault,
with or without the intent to kill or injure, the person convicted shall be
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court."
(Emphasis added.)
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953). See State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778,
155 S.E. 879 (1930).
9264 N.C. at 682, 142 S.E.2d at 635. The defendant, upon retrial, was
charged with felonious assault, but since the jury was probably instructed
that assault with a deadly weapon was a lower degree of the same offense,
they returned a verdict of guilty for the misdemeanor.
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33. The statute itself does not provide a minimum
and maximum sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, and the only
restriction is that against cruel and unusual punishment imposed by N.C.
CONsT. art. 1, § 14. See State v. Crandall 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861
(1945) (two years not cruel and unusual punishment); but see State v.
Austin, 241 N.C. 548, 550, 85 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955) (two years the maxi-
mum sentence).11 264 N.C. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
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previously served is likely to arise: (1) where, as in Weaver, the
sentence imposed at the second trial is for the maximum legal
sentence; (2) where the sentence imposed at the second trial is not
for the maximum legal sentence, and when added to the time served
under the vacated judgment the aggregate does not exceed the maxi-
mum legal sentence; (3) where the sentence imposed at the second
trial is not for the maximum legal sentence but when added to the
time served under the vacated judgment the aggregate does exceed
the maximum legal sentence; and (4) where the defendant has been
confined in jail because of his inability to raise bond or because of
the denial of bond.
In the situation where the maximum legal sentence was imposed
at the second trial, the North Carolina court had, prior to Weaver,
followed the rule that time served in prison under a prior convic-
tion would not as a matter of law be credited to a subsequent sen-
tence resulting from a valid trial. This position was adopted in
State v. Williams.12 In that case the defendant was convicted of
larceny on February 19, 1963, and sentenced to two years in prison.
On July 8, 1963, he was awarded a new trial' in a post-conviction
hearing. 4 On July 29, 1963, he was again convicted of larceny
and sentenced to ten years. The court refused to allow credit for the
time served under the vacated judgment, stating merely that "defen-
dant's contention that the judge was compelled to allow him credit
for the period spent in prison before a valid trial was had is also
without merit." 5 There was no citation of authority, and the fact
that the second sentence imposed a maximum prison sentence was
not stressed.
In the later case of State v. White,"6 decided in the same year,
12261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965).
1" Defendant was awarded a new trial because he had not been afforded
the benefit of counsel.
"a 261 N.C. at 174, 134 S.E.2d 163 at 165. However the court did state
that "the mere fact that different judges impose different punishment does
not invalidate the sentence imposed at the second trial." Ibid.
10262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005
(1965). In White, as in Williams, the defendants were given a longer prison
term upon appeal and retrial. For a more complete discussion of the con-
stitutional aspect of these cases see Alstyne, It Gideon's Wake, 74 YALE L.J.
606 (1965); 1965 DUKE L.J. 395. For a discussion of the wide discretion
of the trial judge in imposing sentence see Penegar, Criminal Law Sanc-
tions in Two Civil Rights Cases-A Brief Comparison, 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 667
(1965).
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the court reconsidered its position and examined the existing author-
ity 7 but did not allow credit for the time served under the vacated
judgment. The court stated that a majority of courts have denied
credit in such situations and that "the rationale of the decisions
seems to be that the defendant in seeking and obtaining a new trial
must be deemed to have consented to a wiping out of all the conse-
quences of the first trial. This is not a denial of defendant's con-
stitutional rights. . ."" In White the defendant was tried and
convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to be imprisoned for ten
years. Subsequently, he obtained a new trial and was again convicted
of armed robbery and sentenced to be imprisoned from twelve to
fifteen years,' 9 a term that was not for the maximum legal sen-
tence,20 nor when added to the time already served under the vacated
judgment did it total the maximum legal sentence. In this respect
White was distinguishable from Williams and some of the authority
relied upon in White would not have been applicable in deciding
Williams.='
After White, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Anderson 2 did not allow the time served under the vacated judg-
ment to count toward a second sentence. This case was factually
in accord with White and distinguishable from Williams, i.e., the
maximum sentence was not imposed. The court denied credit on the
authority of White without discussion.23
"' See, e.g. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922
(1952); In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N.W.2d 251 (1948); In re De
Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N.W.2d 255, cert denied, 336 U.S. 946 (1948);
People v. Trezza, 128 N.Y. 529, 28 N.E. 533 (1891); People ex rel. Lenefsky
v. Ashworth, 56 N.Y.S.2d 5, (Sup. Ct. 1945); Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla.
Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63
S.W. 1009 (1901); State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22
N.W.2d 540 (1946).
18 262 N.C. at 56, 136 S.E.2d at 208.
29 Id. at 53, 136 S.E.2d at 205.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-87 (1953).
2 E.g., In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N.W.2d 251 (1948) (no maximum
sentence imposed at second trial). Cf. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.
445, 108 N.E.2d 922 (1952) (maximum sentefice given, but credit allowed).
Had this case been followed in deciding Williams, a different result would
have been obtained.
22262 N.C. 491, 137 S.E.2d 823 (1964). Defendant was indicted upon a
charge of rape. He entered a plea of guilty to assault with the intent to
commit rape and was sentenced to be imprisoned for not less than twelve
or more than fifteen years. After serving almost three years of the sentence
he was awarded a new trial. He entered the same plea again, and this time
was sentenced to five years.2 262 N.C. at 492, 137 S.E.2d at 824.
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Until Weaver the court was not called upon to decide a case
where the time served under a vacated judgment added to the sen-
tence imposed at the second trial totaled more than the maximum
legal sentence. The court, in allowing credit for the time served
under the first sentence, stated that Williams, to the extent that it
was in conflict with Weaver was overruled.24 The position of the
North Carolina Court in Weaver seems to be in accord with the
weight of authority.25
An examination of the decisions from various jurisdictions re-
veals that several theories have been advanced to support the posi-
tion of not allowing the time served under the vacated judgment to
be credited to the sentence imposed at the second trial. One such
theory is that the first sentence is void, and hence the state has no
responsibility for the punishment the individual has undergone;26
however some courts say that the sentence is merely erroneous and
allow credit for time served." The waiver theory has been used
to deny credit in this situation with, the courts emphasizing the fact
that the defendant himself procured the reversal thereby waiving
the benefit of time served. No court has found a constitutional re-
quirement that credit be allowed;18 however, a growing number of
2'264 N.C. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
" This precise question seems to have been answered in In Matter of
Leypoldt, 32 Cal. App. 2d 518, 90 P.2d 91 (1939); Kozlowski v. Board of
Trustees of New Castle County Workhouse, 2 W. W. Harr. (32 Del.) 29,
118 A. 596 (1921); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922
(1952). Substantially the same question seems to have been decided in
Youst v. United States, 151 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1945); People v. Huber,
389 Il. 192, 58 N.E.2d 879 (1945); People v. Gilbert, 163 Mich. 511, 128
N.W. 756 (1910); see King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.D.C. 1938);
People v. Brown, 383 Ill. 287, 48 N.E.2d 953 (1943). All of these de-
cisions tend to support the decision in Weaver.
" See 45 Micn. L. REv. 912 (1947); 12 U. DET. L.J. 135 (1949).
"* The "waiver" doctrine is a device created to prevent a defendant from
claiming double jeopardy after winning a second trial. Comely, Former
Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 685 (1926), maintains that the "waiver"
doctrine was first stated in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), in which
there was no claim for double jeopardy. See Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (no waiver, and double jeopardy not applicable).
But see People v. Wilson, 391 Ill. 463, 63 N.E.2d 488 (1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 801 (1946). In Illinois the 1941 Indeterminate Sentence Law had
been declared unconstitutional in People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d
569 (1942). During its short life many defendants had been sentenced
under the enactment. Upon resentencing, even though there had been no
appeal and retrial, and hence no waiver, the Illinois court denied credit.
" E.g., Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943)
(no constitutional power in the court to allow credit).
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jurisdictions do grant credit with2 9 or without 0 legislative enact-
ment. One state has even made its statutory provision retroactive,
applying it to all persons in prison at the time of its enactment who
had not been granted creditY'
Prior to Weaver the North Carolina court had rejected the
theory that a previous sentence was void, holding that it was merely
erroneous and hence voidable at the instance of the defendant.'
In Weaver the court took a definite step away from the harsh
technicalities heretofore imposed to deny credit for the time served
before a defendant has been granted a new trial. It intimated that
the trial judge is to have considered the time already served pursuant
to the first sentence when passing judgment at the second trial.
The court goes on to say "when the maximum sentence is imposed
at the second trial, this dispels any suggestion that the trial judge
gave defendant credit for the punishment he had already received.13 3
A situation that the North Carolina court has not yet had to
face is where the sentence imposed at the second trial does not
exceed the maximum legal sentence, but when added to the time
served under the vacated judgment the total is more than the maxi-
mum legal sentence. In this situation the court will be faced with
two alternatives. It may allow credit for the total time served under
the vacated judgment or it may allow credit only for the time in
excess of the maximum legal sentence. Following the rationale of
Weaver it would seem mandatory that full credit be given, since
it is evident that the trial judge did not consider this time when
passing sentence at the second trial.
Another possible solution is to treat this type of sentence as any
other sentence in excess of the legal maximum. The rule regarding
excessive sentences was stated in State v. Austin :4
" See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2900.1 (1949); In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302,
240 P.2d 596 (1952). But cf., State ex reL Nelson v. Ellsworth, 141 Mont.
78, 375 P.2d 316 (1962), where the court interpreted a Montana law as
forbidding credit in certain situations.
30 In re Wilson, 202 Cal. 341, 260 Pac. 542 (1927) ; Little v. Wainwright,
161 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1964); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108
N.E.2d 922 (1962); Ex parte Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. 395, 72 P.2d 904(1938); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
" Millard v. Skillman, 341 Mich. 461, 67 N.W.2d 708 (1951).
82 State v. Goff, 264 N.C. 563, 142 S.E.2d 142 (1965).
11 264 N.C. at 686, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
*'241 N.C. 548, 85 S.E.2d 924 (1955).
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It is the general rule in this jurisdiction that where a defendant
has been properly convicted but given a sentence in excess of that
authorized by law and comes to this court pursuant to a petition
for a writ of certiorari in a habeas corpus proceeding, when such
defendant has not served as long under the sentence as he might
have been legally imprisoned, we vacate the improper sentence
and remand for proper sentence.3,
As noted previously, the North Carolina court expressly refused
to grant credit for the time served in county jail prior to the time
the first sentence was vacated and the second judgment pronounced.
The court stated that "during this period, while in custody in de-
fault of bond, defendant was not serving a sentence as punishment
for the conduct charged in the bill of indictment." 6 Research indi-
cates that only a small minority of jurisdictions grant credit in this
situation.3 7 The view expressed by the North Carolina court has
rarely been challenged by appeal or by collateral attack.
In respect to the credit problem in general, it would seem that
Weaver is at least an affirmative step in the right direction. To
deny a prisoner credit in this situation is to penalize him unduly for
exercising his post-conviction remedies; furthermore, it would seem
to constitute an unnecessary-if not unconstitutional-restraint on
the exercise of such rights."8 It is hoped that the court will extend
this decision to instances-not factually in accord with Weaver-
where the defendant does not receive the maximum sentence upon
the second conviction. One means of assuring that such credit is
granted would be to have the court remanding the case to specify
that the trial court is expressly to give the credit. This would have
the desirable effect of removing any idea from the prisoner's mind, 9
and the minds of the public in general, that time served and good
-1241 N.C. at 550, 85 S.E.2d at 926. (Emphasis added.)
264 at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
See Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1957). The court gave
credit for the time the defendant was confined in jail awaiting a new trial.
He had been awarded a new trial because the sentence imposed at the
previous trial was excessive. Cf. Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d
542 (1964). But see State v. Boles, 148 W.Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964)
(court may at its discretion grant credit from the time first confined).
" See Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965); 1965 DUKE
L.J. 395.
'This would tend to make the prisoner more receptive to prison pro-
grams aimed at helping him become a useful citizen. See Tisdel, Rehabilita-
tion-Colossal Failure, 7 CAN. B.J. 142 (1964) which points out the failure
of the penal systems to rehabilitate and the urgent need for changes to
meet this objective.
[Vol. 44
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED
behavior credits earned would not be tossed into a bottomless pit
under the guise of some harsh and highly technical legal theory.
This approach has been adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. In Stonebreaker v. Smyth" the court expressly provided
that time served under a vacated judgment should be credited to a
second sentence if the defendant were convicted at the second trial.41
The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed this procedure
in analogous situations. In a case involving an excessive sentence
the North Carolina court remanded with the instruction that the
trial court so condition its sentence upon the second sentencing to
allow credit for the time already served.4 2 In another case the
defendant had been found guilty on more than one count and had
been given consecutive sentences. After having served some time
under the first sentence, that conviction was reversed, and the court
remanded with directions to allow the time served toward that sen-
tence to count against the second sentence.43
In Weaver, North Carolina took a giant step in dispensing with
the subtle legal technicalities heretofore utilized to deny credit for
time served under a vacated judgment. By analogy, it could be
argued that the court should grant credit for all confinement follow-
ing the first conviction, be it in prison or in county jail. In Weaver,
the defendant was confined in jail for a period of two months
because of failure to give bond.44 The Florida court, granting credit
under similar circumstances, stated: "It is not petitioner's fault that
the states criminal system failed to judge him guilty and sentence
him properly in an uninterrupted operation. . . . It is only fair to
give petitioner full credit for all time he has been in official custody
since the time of his first commitment ....
BILLY R. BARR
"187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
41 In this case the defendant had served fifteen years under a sentence
imposed for a conviction of armed robbery. Because he had been denied
counsel at the first trial, he was awarded a new trial.
It seems that in other jurisdictions as in North Carolina this problem
has arisen primarily where the right to counsel has been denied in a previous
trial, but the same principle holds true in other situations.
4' State v. Hollars, 260 N.C. 195, 132 S.E.2d 325 (1963).
4" Potter v. State, 263 N.C. 114, 139 S.E.2d 4 (1964).
"264 N.C. at 683, 142 S.E.2d at 635.
"Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1957).
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